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HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS? 
Edited by Robert A. Goldwin' and William Schambra.2 
Washington: American Enterprise Institute. 1985. Pp. ix, 
125. Cloth, $13.95; paper, $5.95. 
Charles Umbanhowar3 
How does the Constitution secure rights? This may strike the 
reader as an obvious question with an equally obvious answer. 
Robert Goldwin, however, has made a credible career in writing 
about public affairs asking equally obvious questions and then dem-
onstrating through carefully selected readings the inadequacies of 
conventional wisdom. He is ably assisted in this book by William 
Schambra. It is the third in a series published by the American 
Enterprise Institute titled A Decade of Study of the Constitution.4 
The book contains six essays written by well-known scholars who 
provide their answers to the question raised in the title. The piece 
by Herbert Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, is re-
printed from another collection of essays. The essays of Owen Fiss 
and Henry Shue are more developed versions of previous papers. 
The contributions of Robert Rutland, Walter Berns, and Nathan 
Tarcov appear to be original undertakings for this book. 
This collection provides a kaleidoscope of conflicting opinions, 
well- calculated to induce us to reconsider our own thoughts about 
how the Constitution secures rights. The discourse is sufficiently 
searching and fresh to recommend the book as a useful supplement 
to courses in American government and constitutional law. 
Rutland and Storing are concerned with the political origins of 
the Bill of Rights and in particular Madison's motivation in leading 
the campaign for its adoption. Rutland interprets Madison's efforts 
as being based on a desire to line up with public opinion. Storing 
demonstrates persuasively that Madison was not simply motivated 
by such calculations but saw the Bill of Rights as an instrument for 
consolidating political consensus behind the new Constitution and 
undermining anti-Federalist opposition. Rutland never really ad-
dresses the question raised in the title, but undertakes to provide 
historical background. 
I. Resident Scholar and Director of Constitutional Studies at the American Enterprise 
Institute. 
2. Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. 
3. Professor of Political Science, St. Olaf College. 
4. The others, by the same editors, are How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 
(1980), and How CAPITALISTIC Is THE CONSTITUTION? ( 1981 ). 
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Fiss and Berns disagree over the role of the federal judiciary in 
American politics. Fiss argues for a judicial activism designed to 
protect the individual from large-scale organizations. He labels this 
model of adjudication "structural reform" because it involves 
judges in the role of reforming the structures of such organizations. 
He finds the older, common law model of adjudication, which em-
phasizes individual rights and duties and a minimal role for govern-
ment, to be inadequate. Berns, on the other hand, is opposed to 
judicial activism and supports his view with a tightly written sum-
mary of natural rights theory. Berns considers this theory to be the 
basis of the Constitution's authority for the securing of rights. In 
addition, he asserts that judicial activism in general is based upon 
an unjustifiable reading of the first section of the fourteenth amend-
ment and urges a return to the intent of its framers. 
Henry Shue, like Fiss, argues for an expansion of the tradi-
tional conception of rights, but employs the more conventional con-
cepts of economic and social rights or, more simply, "subsistence" 
rights. He suggests that the Constitution obligates the American 
government to guarantee human rights to all humans, not just 
Americans: "Most of the people whose subsistence rights are not 
being fulfilled today live outside of the United States. Thus, it is 
U.S. foreign policy that has the greatest potential for increasing the 
enjoyment of subsistence rights." 
Tarcov, in more elaborate fashion than Berns, reexamines the 
fundamentals of the natural rights theory of government. Govern-
ments, he reminds us, are formed by peoples living in political asso-
ciation in order to protect themselves from one another and from 
nonmembers of the political association. Reading Tarcov, we are 
led to conclude that the basic relation between citizen and govern-
ment is violated by Shue's notion of rights protection, which ex-
tends beyond the government's jurisdiction. 
Of the five authors who address the question in the title, all 
agree, albeit for different reasons and in different ways, that while 
the Constitution itself does not secure rights, it is formulated on a 
theory of government that treats rights as paramount and autho-
rizes and describes governmental and political institutions designed 
to secure them. They all tend to downplay the idea that the Bill of 
Rights is crucial in securing rights. Storing suggests that the con-
tent of the Bill of Rights represents a precise list of exceptions from 
national government power and not a guarantee of protection of 
natural rights. He sees a limited, checked-and-balanced but activist 
national government created in the body of the Constitution as the 
securer of rights. Fiss believes that adjudication-the "process by 
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which the values embodied in that text are given meaning"-is cen-
tral to the securing of rights. He argues that his concept of struc-
tural reform is connected to values embodied in the text. Berns 
advances Hamilton's well-known argument against adopting a Bill 
of Rights and emphasizes the role of our pluralist political process 
as the insurer of the rights of minorities from potentially oppressive 
majorities. Tarcov sees anti- democratic institutions like the filibus-
ter, veto, and judicial review as balancing the fundamental demo-
cratic thrust of the regime in a way that secures rights for all. Shue, 
most originally, envisions the State Department in cooperation with 
international organizations as the guarantor of human rights 
everywhere! 
Piss and Shue are, in different ways, for expanding the list of 
rights beyond the traditional ones. Berns and Tarcov are for hold-
ing the line. Tarcov states the differences in the following manner: 
"The form of our rights is that they are primarily rights to do, keep, 
or acquire things and corresponding rights not to have things done to 
us or taken from us. This form contrasts, therefore, with alternative 
conceptions of rights to have things done or given to one." 
Shue describes the same dichotomy in a slightly different way: 
"The best government is the government that most fully honors 
human rights. Sometimes honoring human rights means simply not 
violating rights, ... but sometimes, too, it means protecting rights 
with institutions well designed for the job." 
I believe that these two statements tend to obscure the distinc-
tion that both are attempting to make. The traditional and the new 
view each hold that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are the 
fundamental rights. The significant difference is that traditionalists 
believe that property rights are the necessary means to securing the 
more fundamental rights. Accordingly, government's most impor-
tant task is to protect property claims. The advocates of "new 
rights," on the other hand, feel that this emphasis on property 
rights is excessive. Fiss, for instance, is concerned about reforming 
structures in order to lessen the effects of property claims gone wild. 
Shue, in emphasizing subsistence rights, is attempting to create a 
social "safety net" for those without property. By using the term 
"human rights," advocates of the new rights attempt to draw our 
attention back to the fundamental rights and lessen the importance 
of property rights. Not convinced that the protection of property 
leads inevitably to the protection of people, they would prefer that 
government devote itself to protecting other types of rights. An-
other way of viewing the difference is to contrast the political econ-
omy of laissez-faire capitalism with that of welfare state capitalism. 
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Tarcov and Berns argue for the more abbreviated version of 
rights by asserting that the framers of the Constitution subscribed 
to a traditional natural rights theory that cannot support the 
broader conception of rights. But Piss and Shue feel that this tradi-
tional conception is too narrow and not in tune with the times. 
Each in his own way argues that an expansion of the rights de-
scribed under the traditional theory is justified. Piss stresses 
changed circumstances, while Shue stresses the original meaning of 
natural rights. 
The vulnerability of human beings is the result of our physical fragility. It is ex-
traordinarily easy to put a human being out of business by damaging the workings 
of his or her body. To make an analogy with war, the damage can be produced 
either by direct attack or by deprivation of vital supplies. A few minutes without 
breathable air, a few days without potable water, or a few weeks without edible 
food, and the physical damage to a human being can be as severe, irreversible, and 
fatal as the damage from a bullet or a bomb. 
My own view is that when the abstract distinction between physical security 
and subsistence is doing more to confuse matters than to keep them straight, as it is 
here, theorists should stop insisting upon that distinction and simply think in con-
crete terms of social guarantees, which will always involve some negative duties and 
some positive duties against serious, general, and remediable threats. 
No government can recognize all claims as enforceable rights. 
As Tarcov reminds us: 
Our Constitution secures the rights of individuals to seek satisfaction for their 
desires, but it is compelled to distinguish lawful from lawless desires. Exclusive 
reliance on rights generates irritable litigiousness and empty yearning. Our public 
discourse is impoverished if we only invoke our rights and never debate what is 
good for us, if we only assert our right to pursue happiness and never discuss what 
would make us happy. 
The rhetoric of rights is appealing to theorists because it ap-
pears, although in fact it is not, to be above the realm of consent 
and mere politics. It conjures up visions of justice. Rights theory 
encourages the notion that the rights of men can be discovered by 
reason and are in some sense self- evident or at least subject to ob-
jective determination. It is indeed true that rights may be deter-
mined in this fashion. However, when rights become practical, they 
require the expenditure of government resources (courts, police-
men, bureaucrats, etc.) in order to be secured. We cannot blithely 
assume that the citizenry will consent to any definition of rights that 
sounds attractive to a theorist. This, plus the tremendous cost, is 
what makes Shue's call for a universal human right of subsistence, 
protected by the American government, so problematic. 
Civil rights are the natural rights claimed by individuals that 
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governments are willing to protect. To have civil rights an individ-
ual must live in a civil society. If he were to live outside that soci-
ety, he might assert his natural rights, but he would have to find a 
way to secure them. The American Constitution guarantees the 
natural rights of all citizens not because of their gender, race, previ-
ous nationality, family, religion, and so forth, but because they are 
humans. It is this non-discriminatory, egalitarian feature of the 
American Constitution that leads human rights advocates, such as 
Shue, to propound the notion that our Constitution somehow sup-
ports a universal human right of subsistence. However, under 
rights theory the government is obligated to extend rights only to 
those who are members of the political association. To broaden its 
commitment to those outside the political association would be to 
weaken its agreement with its own citizens, place an impossible de-
mand upon its services, and risk confrontation with other govern-
ments. Recent events in Ethiopia tend to illustrate in practice some 
of these theoretical tensions. Is the solution, as Shue suggests, the 
creation of "large-scale" international organizations as the securers 
of subsistence rights? Or is it the creation of one world government 
with one world political association? 
The issue of which rights are protected by the American Con-
stitution is not to be resolved in an exchange between scholars; it is 
the function of the American government, activated by the political 
process, to do this. No government can honor all of the claims of 
all of its citizens; governments do, however, adopt a pattern in se-
curing rights. This pattern ordinarily conforms to the principle of 
the regime. The task, which Tarcov so ably begins, is to discover 
the first principle of the American regime and use that as the stan-
dard for making critical judgments as to selection. 
Tarcov suggests that the goal or purpose of America is the de-
velopment of the human faculties. In order to clarify and substanti-
ate his claim he calls upon Madison: "The 'first object of 
government,' according to Federalist No. 10, is the protection not of 
'the rights of property' as such but of 'the faculties of men,' from 
which those rights 'originate.' " With all due respect, I believe that 
Tarcov has not read far enough, for in the very next sentence 
Madison writes: "From the [equal?] protection of different and un-
equal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different de-
grees and kinds of property immediately results .... " 
The faculties referred to are those for acquiring property. 
They may have other functions, but Madison chooses to highlight 
their relationship to property. We might further inquire of the 
manner in which one protects these faculties if not by creating 
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rights of property. It would not be surprising to anyone, I trust, if 
the goal of America were found to be the promotion of commerce 
through the protection of property. Of course, Madison's claim is 
not sufficient to make it so. We would wish to consider the history 
of distributive justice in America. Having done that, however, I 
suppose we would find that the Madisonian formula would fare 
very well indeed. 
LIFE IN THE BALANCE: EXPLORING THE ABOR-
TION CONTROVERSY. By Robert N. Wennberg.1 Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1985. 
Pp. xi, 184. Paper $7.95. 
Michael Levin 2 
It may sound odd to say this about a discussion of a topic as 
grim and contentious as abortion, but Robert Wennberg has written 
an extremely agreeable book, a model of philosophical method. 
Professor Wennberg is an accomplished enough philosopher to be 
unafraid of writing clearly, and of admitting that every position on 
abortion, including his own, will be unsatisfying in some way. Sim-
ply as exposition and a display of intellectual flexibility, Life in the 
Balance is quite superior to Michael Tooley's 1984 book, Abortion 
and Infanticide, the only comparable survey of the abortion issue by 
a philosopher working in the analytic tradition. 
Wennberg devotes most of this book to arguing that the devel-
oping fetus has a right to life. Crucial to the articulation of his case 
is Wennberg's well-taken insistence that the question "Does the fe-
tus have a right to life?" be distinguished from the question "Is the 
fetus a person?," where a person is "a being who possesses the devel-
oped capacity to engage in acts of intellect (to think, to use lan-
guage, etc.), acts of emotion (to love, to hate, etc.), and acts of will 
(to make moral choices, to affirm spiritual ideals, etc.)." What 
Wennberg dubs the "actuality thesis," that only beings that are ac-
tually persons have a right to life, is a substantive moral thesis in no 
way implicit in the concept of a right to life. Actualism, construed 
as a substantive moral thesis, does have the advantage of resolving 
the abortion issue very cleanly: since the cerebral functioning of 
even a very late term fetus is insufficiently integrated to create per-
1. Professor of Philosophy, Westmont College, Santa Barbara. 
2. Professor of Philosophy, City College of New York and the Graduate Center, 
CUNY. 
